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On the Shoulders of Giants? Global Science, Resource
Asymmetries, and Repositioning of Research
Universities in China and Russia
ANATOLY OLEKSIYENKO
Chinese and Russian universities are increasingly drawn into center-periphery reposi-
tioning, as they compete for symbolic, financial, and intellectual resources locally and
globally. However, their strategies on national and institutional linkages differ with
regards to the individual scientist’s powers in knowledge production. As global hier-
archies of knowledge productivity benchmark prestigious publications, and national
industries seek access to innovative products in global research and development labs,
globally connected talents become essential for elevating local research performance.
This article examines the undercurrents of center-periphery repositioning in Russia and
China by comparing their research and development funding and performance data,
as well as contrasting their global standing with Brazil, India, South Africa, and G7
members. A method of comparative multilayered patterning of mixed data sets is used
to reflect on center-periphery dilemmas facing the Chinese and Russian scientists.
Introduction
Concerns about growing inequities in higher education have been intensi-
fying, as universities and individual academics are increasingly drawn into
competition and become exposed to resource asymmetries and positions of
disadvantage locally, nationally, and globally.1 The world-class universitymove-
ment was expected to rectify resource asymmetries between the privileged
North and postcolonial South (Altbach 2007; Altbach and Salmi 2011). How-
ever, national recipients of privileged funding in developing countries
emerged as key contributors to inequality in local resource flows (Marginson
2004). National and institutional inequities became more exposed through
various ranking tables sorting intellectual and productive capacities (Cowen
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1996; Altbach 2013). For universities confronting peripherality, strategic cal-
ibration of resource providers is essential but also more difficult, as public
support has become unreliable as a consequence of the changing nature,
interests, and commitments of domestic prote´ge´s, sponsors, and industrial
stakeholders affected by globalization.2
Given their potential to enhance access to larger and superior knowledge
pools and to reduce costs, boundary-crossing collaborations emerged as an
opportunity to level the inequities and position some universities more fa-
vorably. Nonetheless, the advantages that arise from such access are not
necessarily sustainable, as collaborators confront ontological, epistemic, or-
ganizational, and cultural incompatibilities.3 Leading contributors are more
concerned about return on investment and the quality of shared outcome
in competitive fields and tend to withdraw support to asymmetric collabo-
rations earlier than in precompetitive areas of research and development
(see some examples in Reich [2002] and NRC [2008]). Increasingly, partner-
seekers pursue a higher status match in local and global university rankings
and hence marginalize the lower strata of partakers (Marginson 2004; Slaugh-
ter and Rhoades 2004; Altbach 2013).
Equitable benefit-sharing often appears unrealizable, as collaborators are
advantaged or disadvantaged by their economic, political, and sociocultural
contexts (Tierney 2001; Altbach and Balan 2007; Oleksiyenko and Sa´ 2010).
As hyperfragmented organizations facing competing multistakeholder de-
mands (Clark 1998), research universities are often predisposed to variable
growth across faculties and disciplines, receiving uneven support from in-
dustries, governments, and private sponsors (Geiger 2004; Burke 2006).
Within the eclectic assortments of professional and epistemic norms and
cultures that characterize boundary-crossing collaborations, there is often an
imbalance in stakeholder contributions, institutional engagement, and in-
dividual commitment (Whitley 2008; Siegel 2010). In cases of success at the
individual level, it can be difficult to extend the effects across the entire
institution, or across the boundaries of various communities of interest (Reich
2002; Siegel 2010).
Despite the imbalances, the quest for beneficial positioning in partner-
ships persists, as governments expect boundary-crossing experiences to boost
innovation and productivity of the national R&D systems and local economies
(Wagner and Leydesdorff 2005; Royal Society 2011). At a time when anxiety
about institutional status grows and the pursuit of prestige intensifies (Locke
2011), some stakeholders are also raising legitimate concerns about gover-
nance and funding of academic partnerships aimed at international problem
solving in relation to global challenges (Mok 2005; Jones and Oleksiyenko
2011). Given the growing interest of higher education policy makers in pro-
2 Clark (1998); Marginson (2004); Slaughter and Rhoades (2004); Jongbloed et al. (2008).
3 Dill and Vught (2010); Siegel (2010); Jones and Oleksiyenko (2011); Li and Chen (2011).
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.5 on Mon, 23 Feb 2015 23:17:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
484 August 2014
OLEKSIYENKO
moting better collaboration locally and globally, a number of studies have
called for additional insights on the relational discrepancies and organiza-
tional incongruities tackled by universities across various levels of governance
(Obamba and Mwembe 2009; Jones and Oleksiyenko 2011). While previous
research offers ample coverage of boundary-crossing challenges at the level
of institutions, the literature pays little attention to individual researchers
who manage access to networks and drive advancement of institutions in
national and supranational knowledge hierarchies. Yet, there are important
questions about individual researchers: What types of discrepancies do they
have to mitigate in these hierarchies and networks? What allows them to
balancemultilayered cost-benefit dependencies in disparate stakeholder com-
munities at home and abroad? To what extent can center-periphery repo-
sitioning generate growth-share balances in collaborative science?
This article examines scientists’ dependencies on stakeholder positions
in driving resources toward local and global R&D networks and hierarchies.
A comparative case of Chinese and Russian R&D funding and performance
is used to explore these dependencies. The following section presents an
analytical framework for multilayered leveraging of positioning to acquire
resources in stratified science communities. The subsequent section outlines
the comparative patterning of mixed data sets that reflect these dependen-
cies. Finally, the article clarifies a number of findings and considers the
implications of the growth/share dilemmas faced by the sample R&D systems,
their research universities and scientists.
Disproportionate Growth and Multilayered Resource Dependencies
Robert Merton’s theory of cumulative advantage/disadvantage provides
an interesting departure point for a discussion of positioning challenges in
science. The theory argues that hierarchies in science arise when some re-
searchers accumulate benefits earlier and faster than their peers as a result
of strategic career start-ups, mentorship, productivity, privileged networks,
and prestigious institutional frameworks (Merton 1965, 1988). The proverbial
“Matthew effect” often works for “high producers” who are prudently posi-
tioned for relational choices (Zuckerman 1967; Crane 1972; Slaughter and
Rhoades 2004). The literature, however, also notes that “high producers”
(e.g., Nobel Prize winners) tend to receive acclaim, power, and resources
that far exceed what they themselves consider deserved in regards to co-
authorships or other collaborative projects.
The tendency to use prestige as a proxy for excellence has a long history,
an example of which Merton (1965) investigates by considering the noto-
riously long-standing debate on whether Newton had plagiarized key ele-
ments of his law of universal gravitation from Robert Hooke. A professor at
Cambridge, Newton seemingly admitted in a private letter that he was in-
debted to his less famous colleague Hooke, a professor at a lesser known
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university in London and a correspondence coordinator and experiment
curator at the Royal Society. Newton wrote to Hooke: “You have added much
several ways, & especially in taking ye colours of thin plates into philosophical
consideration. . . . If I have seen further it is by standing on ye shoulders of Giants”
(Merton 1965, 31). Newton subsequently refused to give public recognition
to Hooke and actually did all he could to obscure Hooke’s achievements
upon assuming the presidency of the Royal Society. Thus, it was never made
clear on whose shoulders Newton stood. In discussing the intellectual com-
petition-collaboration implications, Merton focused at one point on whether
the italics in reprinted copies of Newton’s letter, circulated among the sci-
entific community, represented emphasis made by the author or by those
scrutinizing his work and legacy. However, Merton examined the origins of
the famous aphorism “standing on the shoulders of giants,” often attributed
to Newton; Merton tracked the aphorism back to pre-Newtonian times and
rummaged through literary and historical archives to explain how the “giant-
dwarf” allegory became popular in the interpretation of intellectual asym-
metries long before Newton brought it back into vogue.
The study offers a reminder of the sometimes awkward and tangled web
of knowledge interpretation, dissemination, borrowing, and ownership that
affects collaborative science. Insofar as partnership intentions are concerned,
the giant/dwarf duality appears to acquire variable meanings as the giants
occasionally become dwarfs and vice versa, and scientific contributions and
recognition may be filtered through asymmetries, misattributions, or mis-
interpretation. Also, what may be of a marginal value could become suddenly
magnified or overexaggerated, while important issues are easily sidelined.
Merton’s work also suggests that the unfair accumulation of attributes on
one or the other side of scientific relations can contribute to disproportionate
growth of advantage or disadvantage in the long run.
While investigating psychosocial dynamics of productivity and collabo-
ration in science, Merton and his colleagues (e.g., Coles and Zuckerman)
gave cursory consideration to the roles of national contexts and institutional
climates in achieving individual success. The institutional perspective of cu-
mulative advantage acquired weight with Philip Altbach’s framing of a world-
class university and its role in the reinforcement of center-periphery divides
in higher education. Altbach and his colleagues (see, e.g., Altbach and Balan
2007, Altbach and Salmi 2011) outlined strategies promoted by a select num-
ber of nation-states to support their leading institutions in the acquisition
and concentration of intellectual and material resources. The simultaneous
impact of global, national, regional, and local pressures on human and in-
stitutional agencies of higher education (Marginson and Rhoades 2002) has
further moved the discussion in favor of multilayered analysis of institutional
strategies in globalizing environments (Jones and Oleksiyenko 2011). In the
multilayered center-periphery constructs, it is not only developing countries
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and their institutions, but also some faculties and disciplines in well-off R&D
systems that can appear on the outskirts of the “empires of knowledge”
(Altbach 2007). Nations, institutions, faculties, research centers and individ-
uals are destined to be marginalized if they do not create the necessary plug-
ins for connecting with and utilizing the intellectual and/or financial flows
that intermittently emerge at the lower or upper levels of the multilayered
governance matrices (Jones and Oleksiyenko 2011).
The institutional cases collected by Altbach and Salmi (2011) provide
ample evidence about how universities gain or lose opportunities to deter-
mine their global standing. To break the cycles of disadvantage, universities
tend to espouse strategies to reorganize governance, attract and retain talents,
increase productivity, and promote themselves in the global knowledge net-
works (Altbach and Salmi 2011). However, what is often missed is that “catch-
ing up” in the global race requires sustainable commitments not only from
governments, industrial sponsors, or university leaders but also from individ-
ual scientists. In the current hierarchy of higher education, the individual’s
assortment of strategic stakeholders and sustainable productivity at the world-
class level either enhances or reduces the asymmetric positions of their in-
stitutions and nations (Oleksiyenko and Sa´ 2010). As higher education sys-
tems and their universities compete for resources in expectation of
strengthening their global positions or moving out of the periphery to the
center of global knowledge production, dependencies of the scientists’ re-
search strategies on systemic and institutional support deserve greater atten-
tion.
A Comparative Study of China and Russia
To explore these dependencies, this article conducted a comparative
study of the rapidly transforming research systems of China and Russia. The
study examined research performance and funding data included in the
statistical reports of international agencies (e.g., UNESCO, OECD [Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development], Thomson Reuters),
previous studies on Chinese and Russian research universities, and consul-
tations with higher education experts in the two countries. The quantitative
data were analyzed in comparison with equivalent data sets frommajor global
alliance members, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa),
and G7 members (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United King-
dom, and the United States). Juxtaposing the data sets made it possible to
see the Russian and Chinese positions within a larger context of international
R&D relations.
The repositioning-related challenges were tracked at three levels: super-
structure, structure, and understructure. At the superstructure level, a mul-
ticountry comparison of general expenditures on R&D (GERD) and fluc-
tuations in major components, such as higher education R&D (HERD),
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business R&D (BRD), government R&D (GRD), and foreign R&D (FRD),
were analyzed to illustrate the growth or reduction of asymmetries in the
national redistributive mechanisms. Comparative data were primarily drawn
from international data sets provided by UNESCO and OECD. At the struc-
ture level, this study examined performance criteria in national higher ed-
ucation system rankings (e.g., Universitas 21-U21) and university rankings
(e.g., Shanghai Jiao Tong University Academic Ranking of World Universities
[ARWU] and Times Higher Education [THE]). The institutional level in
each country was represented by the two top research performers in ARWU
and/or THE. Correlations between funding at the superstructure level and
performance at the structure level were scrutinized. Finally, at the under-
structure level, the paper correlated the preceding interdependencies with
researchers’ total production and international coauthorship in SCI (Science
Citation Index) and SSCI (Social Science Citation Index) publications.
At each level, the growth trajectories were compared with the help of
time series analysis of R&D funding and performance in China and Russia,
in juxtaposition with similar data from low- to middle-income countries (as
represented by BRICS) and high-income countries (as represented by several
G7 members). Given the consistency of criteria and data collection ap-
proaches in the above-mentioned international databases and ranking sys-
tems, longitudinal trends and challenges were tracked. Comparative multi-
scalar analysis allowed for correlating a range of variables reflecting the
often-ambiguous layers of contextual and organizational changes taking place
simultaneously across the local, national, and global domains (Marginson
and Rhoades 2002). Cross-layer cascade effects were compared across the
sampled R&D systems in BRICS and G7 countries.
To mitigate the analytical generalization limits imposed by the sample
and the focus on research performance and funding within several countries,
the study conducted data triangulation to enhance construct validity. The
additional data sources included policy statements by ministries of education,
science, and technology, and national academies of sciences; university stra-
tegic plans and annual reports; and online narratives and scholarly
publications in English, Chinese, and Russian. In addition, 10 university ex-
perts (N p 5 in Russia, and N p 5 in China) provided insights into the
interpretation of some data and identified gaps in the evolving analytical
construct.
The analytical narrative applies the “giant-dwarf” aphorism to controver-
sial interpretations in science, which are affected by asymmetries and cu-
mulative (dis)advantages in collaborative relations. Both universities and sci-
entists in China and Russia lived through giant-dwarf transformations at
various times. Having followed the Soviet model of higher education since
the 1950s, China abandoned it to compete with the new global giants—the
United States and Japan—half a century later. As a world mega-economy on
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the rise, China began to transform its academic R&D from dwarf to giant in
the global research university rankings. Dwarfed by the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia has also been making efforts to regain its once-robust powers
in global science. Russian policy makers recently tried to emulate China’s
strategy of lifting national research universities in the global hierarchies of
knowledge through selective funding programs. While both countries aspire
to reposition their sciences, their strategies in handling global asymmetries
have acquired contrasting approaches to stakeholder configurations and out-
reach to global science. The discussion below focuses on differences, incon-
sistencies, and gaps in the configurations of emerging global “scientometrics”
that are sometimes politicized in the context of emerging tensions between
the global scientific North and South, as the center-periphery repositioning
intensifies.
Findings: Producers and Produced
The global competitiveness of universities depends on resource distri-
bution controlled by local stakeholders, including governments, industries,
and universities. Academics emerge as critical producers in moving national
and institutional positions in global hierarchies. However, those efforts can
be either energized or dampened by stakeholders who have complementary
or competing interests and commitments. To some extent, the lingering
Soviet tradition of “academic commitment to industrial interests” placed Chi-
nese and Russian academics in an advantageous position to draw on cross-
sectoral R&D funds, whereas academics in other countries (e.g., Canada and
the United Kingdom) have struggled in that respect (Slaughter and Leslie
1997; Froumin and Salmi 2007; Mok 2008). Moreover, the growing influence
of the global economy on the Chinese national R&D portfolio and the tight-
ening grip of authoritarian state control in Russia have yielded different
outcomes: on the one hand, internationalizing Chinese businesses have ac-
celerated academic internationalization, and vice versa, facilitating a more
immediate plug-in to global norms of production, productivity, and com-
petitiveness; on the other hand, Russian protectionism has pushed industrial
and academic R&D to the bottom of the global performance pyramids. These
outcomes demonstrate how academic “producers” (Crane 1972) are affected
by the broader economic system in which they work.
Given their common desire to elevate their positions in the global hi-
erarchies of science, Chinese and Russian academics are seeking greater
autonomy to compete for prestigious grants, awards, and influence in world-
leading journals. Over the last decade, Chinese universities have been re-
structuring academic governance to improve their productivity in SCI
publications (Hayhoe et al. 2010). In contrast, most Russian universities have
continued to rely on European-style bureaucratic steering embedded in heav-
ily regulated teaching (Hayhoe 1989), and only some encouraged their sci-
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entists to give more attention to globally connected curiosity-driven research
(Froumin and Salmi 2007). Senior scientists who are cross-affiliated with the
Russian Academy of Sciences are the exception when it comes to publishing,
but many of them tend to attribute their production to the science academy
rather than to their home university. While Russian university administrators
may be reluctant to go along with the challenge of productivity benchmarking
in global hierarchies, the revival of patriotic and nationalist sentiment in
Russia has resulted in a loss of traction with Europe that itself is in “catch-
up” mode (Guriev 2009; Kortunov 2009, Horta 2010). The local-global tug-
of-war becomes more intense as post-Soviet Russia and China watch and
nudge each other toward greater competition and fuel ambitions for center-
periphery repositioning between the scientific North and South. The chang-
ing stakeholder power configurations at the superstructure, structure, and
understructure levels demonstrate the shift of paradigms in global compe-
tition and collaboration.
Superstructure
In 2012, Universitas 21 consolidated over 20 indicators to compare the
performance of 48 leading national higher education systems, identified by
the American National Science Foundation as the top 2006–7 research per-
formers. China and Russia scored relatively low on this evaluative scheme
due to more limited resources (measured by government expenditures, total
expenditures, and R&D expenditures on tertiary institutions) and poor con-
nectivity (represented by numbers of inbound international students and
journal publications coauthored with international collaborators). While Rus-
sia was slightly ahead of China (see table A1; tables A1–A8 available online),
China outperformed Russia in the categories of environment (e.g., data
quality, gender balances, regulatory climate) and output (e.g., scientific
publications, world-class universities).
Further evidence of improvement in China’s environment and outputs
is found in the ARWU’s top 500–ranked universities list; the number of
Chinese world-class universities grew from 8 to 34 between 2005 and 2010
(see table A7). This rise is particularly impressive when compared to Russia’s
lack of progress over the same period. With a large higher education system
(1,129 universities) and limited resources, China achieved results through
preferential funding of top performers, which spearheaded institutional dif-
ferentiation, stimulated domestic competition, and led to the adoption of
global isomorphism (Cai 2010). For example, the Chinese government’s
1990s policy favored a small group of contenders among China’s 1,129 uni-
versities: its 211 Program selected and provided preferential funding to the
top 112 universities, and subsequently, the 985 Program filtered the recipients
down to 39. The Chinese government dramatically increased GERD in total,
as well as per researcher, over the last decade (seven times and almost three
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times, respectively; see table A2). China appeared to be working harder than
its BRICS counterparts and outperformed the G7’s Canada and Germany,
outpacing every other country among the BRICS and G7 members (except
the United States) in total expenditures by 2010. Meanwhile, Russian aca-
demics were chiefly concerned with ensuring a “fair and equal system.” As
one study participant put it, there was a concern that “[Russia’s] vast territory,
including immense permafrost Siberia, also needed universities and research”
(also see Markusova et al. 2004). According to Gokhberg and Kuznetsova
(2010), 78 percent of Russia’s 1,134 universities performed some level of
R&D.
Given the contrasting approaches, the cross-stakeholder distribution of
R&D resources in China and Russia and the low performance and funding
indicators in the university sectors of the two countries (around 8 percent
of the national R&D budget in 2010; see table A3) had different implications.
China concentrated resources in the designated “Ivy League” universities,
while Russia was spreading the budget as wide as possible until recently.
Funding of public versus private stakeholders presents another contrast.
Between 2000 and 2010, China shifted research resources to industry, while
Russia favored governmental laboratories controlled by theNational Academy
of Sciences. Chinese industry increased its share of the total R&D funding
from 58 percent to 72 percent, while the share for government institutions
decreased from 33 percent to 23 percent. Given these numbers alone, Chi-
nese and Russian universities with 8 percent performance in the GERD may
appear as losers in the global R&D layouts (especially as compared with other
global players, such as universities in Canada and Brazil with 38 percent, and
South Africa and the United Kingdom with over 20 percent).
However, indicators of university-industry linkages, as revealed in the 2010
THE rankings, show that China outperforms leading American universities
(table A4). Indeed, China surpassed all BRICS and G7 countries in terms of
the higher education R&D share funded by industry. This flow of funds
increased from 32.3 percent to 33.2 percent between 2000 and 2010 and
achieved a higher volume of HERD (in purchasing power parity [PPP$])
than in Canada and Germany (table A5). Furthermore, China’s National Hi-
Tech 863 program was reported to have 57.9 percent of its 1,220 projects in
biotech, material sciences, and agriculture implemented by universities. The
proportion of academic engagement is most likely to be even higher given
that the 863 projects implemented by industry and state-owned research
enterprises engaged university researchers (Mu 2010, 387).
At the same time, the percentage of funds for basic research in China
declined from 5.2 to 4.6 percent. In comparison, this proportion has grown
in Russia from 13.4 to 19.6 percent and in the United States from 15.9 to
18.9 percent between 2000 and 2010 (table A6). China has also empowered
its industries to “borrow” ideas globally. For example, Huawei Technologies
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set up five research institutes in Silicon Valley and Dallas (Unites States),
Bangalore (India), Sweden, and Russia to access world knowledge (OECD
2008). Other enterprises, like Lenovo and GEELY, were “accessing foreign
R&D resources by means of transnational acquisitions” (Mu 2010, 389–90).
Back home, Chinese authorities admitted to their country’s increasing de-
pendence on foreign direct investments, which also implied a growing de-
mand among globalizing enterprises for Chinese graduates withmultinational
competencies (Weifang 2012). This required Chinese authorities to shift their
rhetoric from benchmarking “the old-days national culture and pride in sci-
ences” to “winning the modern global game, which can later boost the pride.”
In Russia, the proportion of industrial money in the GERD declined from
33 to 25 percent, while governmental expenditures increased from 55 to 70
percent, primarily for fundamental and applied research performance in
governmental and university labs (see tables A3 and A6). In a reversal of the
post-Soviet democratization and decentralization of the 1990s, Russian pol-
icies of the 2000s have aimed at tightening bureaucratic control in accordance
with Soviet templates, sometimes for the sake of improving Russia’s national
science and technology standing in increasing global competition. For ex-
ample, a radical reform of the 289-year-old Russian Academy of Sciences, an
archaic institution with a historical legacy of anti-Western sentiments (al-
though still a top Russian performer, according to SCOPUS results in table
5), was viewed by some scientists as an attempt of the Russian government
to enhance the country’s global standing by rearranging power relations
among research institutions and universities at home.
Structure
Russia’s reforms aimed at catching up with China have been slow. Only
two Russian universities—Moscow State University and St. Petersburg State
University—appeared in the ARWU 2003 top 500 league, in the 102–51 and
401–50 spots, respectively. In defiance, the Russian rankers developed their
own world university ranking system in which Moscow State University oc-
cupied the top position. However, as global recognition of ARWU expanded,
while the Russian ranking system failed to receive acclaim and a growing
number of global university leagues disdained Russian institutional perfor-
mance, the Russian government switched course in 2008, deciding to launch
radical reform of its higher education system.
This 2008 reform involved a preferential funding model, creating com-
petitive research foundations, sending scholars abroad, and seeking out in-
ternational collaborative enterprises with top universities. Russia designated
29 “national research universities” and nine federal universities to lead the
R&D agenda nationally. In 2013, Russia pursued the so-called 5/100 scheme,
aiming to have five national universities join the top 100 world-class univer-
sities by 2020. Meanwhile, China saw the emergence of C9 (i.e., “Chinese Ivy
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League”), comprising nine leading universities from among the former 211
and 985 Program funding recipients.
Russia’s 5-100-2020 ambition was a big stretch in the absence of a clear
understanding of the Chinese implementation steps. Chinese universities
were able to rise higher and faster in rating systems like the ARWU, which
emphasize verifiable numbers (e.g., number of prizes, citations) rather than
expert opinions on which the THE international rankers rely (table A7). As
one of the Chinese observers noted, “the Chinese scholars would not be able
to do well in the systems where Western buddies praise Western buddies.”
Indeed, what the ARWU-THE juxtaposition shows is that all the BRICS mem-
bers do better in the numbers-driven, rather than opinion-influenced, race.
Moreover, success was not merely dependent on resource concentration
and access to privileged money. Chinese universities invested in increasing
cross-border mobility, global networking, and SCI publication incentives, as
well as in recruiting and reintegrating Chinese scholars who were enjoying
successful careers at the top 500 ARWU American and Canadian universities.
Alas, the reintegration resulted in major strains in relations between locals
and returnees (Yang 2009; Economist 2013). It was the painful restructuring
and discriminative compensation and tenure schemes that allowed the 211
and 985 investments of the 1990s to provide good returns a decade later.
A close-up of a sample of SJTU-ranked research universities shows that
China’s top research performers (Peking University and Tsinghua University)
have been placing significant emphasis on advancing their positions in the
production of SCI-indexed papers, including in the two highest impact-factor
journals, Nature and Science (table A7). While they still struggled to keep up
per-capita academic performance, Peking University and Tsinghua University
showed consistently higher results across the production of indexed papers
than Russia’s Moscow State University and St. Petersburg University in the
Shanghai ranking league. In general, cross-country and cross-institutional
analyses of publication and citation ratios suggest that universities at the
summit of the ranking pyramid tend to experience fluctuations in their per-
formance too, and hence their positions of power are vulnerable, especially
in the absence of consistent performance of individual researchers. Note, for
example, the overall decline in the “per capita academic performance” in
sampled universities, except for Berkeley, in table A8.
Understructure
Real change in global repositioning primarily depends on “high pro-
ducers” (Crane 1972) who increasingly play decisive roles in global sci-
ence networks and participate in international symposia, peer-reviewed
publications, academic mobility, and Internet-based exchanges. As table 1
demonstrates, the annual world output of SCI/SSCI publications grew from
year to year over the last decade (from 768,173 in 2000 to 1,152,090 in 2010).
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TABLE 1
Selected Countries’ SCI and SSCI Publications Output (2000–2010)
National Number of Papers
World Total
(%)
National Number of Papers,
Social Sciences
% of Social Science Articles
in the Total No. of Articles
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Country NT Uni.
Uni./
NT
(%) NT Uni.
Uni./
NT
(%) NT Uni. NT Uni. NT Uni.
Uni./
NT
(%) NT Uni.
Uni./
NT
(%) NT Uni. NT Uni.
Brazil 10,773 8,781 81.5 31,591 28,487 90.2 1.4 1.6 2.7 3.0 441 384 87.1 3021 2713 89.8 4.1 4.4 9.6 9.5
Russia 26,857 13,445 50.1 26,538 14,638 55.2 3.5 2.4 2.3 1.6 577 262 45.4 611 336 55.0 2.1 1.9 2.3 2.3
India 16,780 7,492 44.6 41,304 20,613 49.9 2.2 1.4 3.6 2.2 387 151 39.0 1,227 684 55.7 2.3 2.0 3.0 3.3
China 29,905 23,781 79.5 137,320 122,225 89.0 3.9 4.3 11.9 13.0 864 807 93.4 4,906 4,606 93.9 2.9 3.4 3.6 3.8
South Africa 3,498 3,069 87.7 7,430 7,060 95.0 .5 .6 .6 .7 387 350 90.4 1,693 1,631 96.3 11.06 11.4 22.8 23.1
Canada 32,572 28,645 87.9 52,431 48,903 93.3 4.2 5.2 4.5 5.2 4,431 4,148 93.6 9,963 9,576 96.1 13.6 14.5 19.0 19.6
Germany 65,216 51,140 78.4 84,654 70,901 83.7 8.5 9.3 7.3 7.5 3,369 2,591 76.9 8,133 6,907 84.9 5.2 5.1 9.6 9.7
Japan 72,503 57,282 79.0 72,694 62,264 85.6 9.4 10.4 6.3 6.6 1,208 1,047 86.7 2,466 2,298 93.2 1.7 1.8 3.4 3.7
France 47,393 27,158 57.3 60,742 47,643 78.4 6.2 4.9 5.3 5.1 1,916 1,155 60.3 4,327 3,418 79.0 4.0 4.2 7.1 7.2
USA 247,667 193,912 78.3 319,921 270,424 84.5 32.2 35.2 27.8 28.8 39,067 32,151 82.3 62,824 54,961 87.5 15.8 16.6 19.6 20.3
World 768,173 551,019 71.7 1152,090 939,076 81.5 72.0 75.3 72.4 73.8 79,202 58,721 74.1 153,609 130,451 84.9 10.3 10.7 13.3 13.9
Source.—Compiled from Thomson Reuters, “Web of Science: Core Collection,” accessed via http://apps.webofknowledge.com.
Note.—NT p national total; Uni. p university-based; SCI p Science Citation Index; SSCI p Social Sciences Citation Index.
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Universities played a greater role by increasing their contribution to this
volume from 70 to 81.4 percent. China’s overall output in the world pro-
duction increased almost fourfold (from 29,905 to 137,320), while the uni-
versities’ stake in the national SCI/SSCI output grew from 79.5 to 89 percent.
China’s proportion of world output increased from 3.9 to 11.9 percent be-
tween 2000 and 2010. This increase took place primarily in science and
technology domains (96.38 percent of the total), while social sciences and
humanities continued to lag behind, even after some increase (from 2.3 to
3.0 percent, compared with the world’s average of 10.3 to 13.3 percent)
during this period. Although it started out on equal footing with Russia in
2000, China outperformed Russia sevenfold in SCI output and ninefold in
SSCI output a decade later. Meanwhile, Russian performance in this category
stayed relatively stagnant (26,857 in 2000 to 26,358 in 2010). Russian SCI/
SSCI production remained almost equally split between the National Acad-
emy of Sciences and universities. The latter’s output increased over the last
decade, but insignificantly. In 2010, China claimed the best performance in
the SCI/SSCI category among the BRICS and G7 countries. This result was
in sync with the rise of Chinese universities in the ARWU university rankings.
While the overall publication record looks interesting, the picture
changes somewhat when the focus shifts to the publication volume per R&D
personnel. An analysis of the R&D personnel capacities in the Chinese and
Russian systems sheds light on the earlier mentioned discrepancies. Russia’s
R&D personnel head count (HC) and full-time employment (FTE) numbers
indicate that academic researchers have been overemployed, simultaneously
holding several full-time positions (53,290 HC per 113,353 FTE positions),
while in China almost 50 percent of the university-based R&D personnel were
underemployed (593,569 HC per 289,670 FTE; table 2). Besides, China’s
academic R&D workforce was 10 times larger than Russia’s in 2010, while
Russia saw declining HC and FTE numbers over the last decade. Provided
that China could employ its R&Dpersonnel fully and increase the productivity
of its research staff in terms of SCI/SSCI publications, it would most likely
become a global leader in both world output and world-class university per-
formance.
China’s position, however, depends on the performance of other R&D
systems. Japan’s recent slip from the second position in global output is partly
due to a 40,000 FTE decline in the Japanese academic R&D personnel and
a doubling of part-time positions (e.g., 375,160 HC per 188,324 FTE in 2010;
see table 3). China’s ability to overtake Japan can also be explained by a
nearly double increase of FTE R&D positions across all of its sectors: industry,
government, and academic (from 922,131 in 2000 to 2,553,828 in 2010,
including from 159,246 to 289,670 in Chinese universities, as compared with
a decline from 227,882 to 188,324 in Japan). It is not clear what path China
would take in the future when other systems (e.g., Brazil, Germany) increase
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TABLE 2
Head Count (HC) and Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Personnel in the National R&D Systems
Total R&D Personnel (HC) Total R&D Personnel (FTE)
Number % Number %
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Brazil:
Industry 86,183 66,212 37.2 14.1 55,436 55,436 41.7 20.8
Government 8,691 14,187 3.7 3.0 8,691 14,187 6.5 5.3
Universities 136,658 391,222 59.1 83.4 68,331 195,614 51.4 73.3
Private nonprofit 544 1,472 .2 .3 544 1,472 .4 .5
Russia:
Industry 590,646 423,112 66.5 57.4 628,858 444,111 62.4 52.8
Government 255,850 259,007 28.8 35.1 276,373 280,506 27.4 33.4
Universities 40,787 53,290 4.6 7.2 99,552 113,353 9.9 13.5
Private nonprofit 446 1131 .05 .15 2,474 2,022 .2 .24
China:
Industry NA 2,432,903 NA 68.6 532,114 1,873,913 52.1 73.4
Government NA 515,772 NA 14.6 282,094 390,245 30.6 15.3
Universities NA 593,569 NA 16.7 159,246 289,670 17.3 11.3
Private nonprofit NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
German:
Industry (342,978) (383,559) (50.1) (49.5) 312,490 337,211 64.4 61.4
Government (84,695) 107,997 (12.7) (13.3) 71,454 90,531 14.7 16.5
Universities (246,751) 301,633 (37.1) (37.1) 100,790 120,784 20.8 22
Private nonprofit NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Japan:
Industry (629,487) 696,973 (59.9) 60.1 581,721 614,772 64.9 70
Government 68,887 70,941 6.6 6.1 59,254 61,830 7.2 7.0
Universities 308,525 375,160 (31.5) 32.4 227,882 188,324 25.4 21.5
Private nonprofit 21,386 (16,472) 1.4 27,990 13,002 3.1 1.5
Source.—Compiled from UNESCO (2013).
Note.—NA p data not available.
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TABLE 3
SCI/SCCI Productivity per R&D Head Count (HC) and Full-Time Equivalent (FTE)
R&D HC in
Universities
R&D FTE in
Universities
SCI/SCCI Papers Pro-
duced in Universities Productivity per HC Productivity per FTE
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
Brazil 136,658 391,222 68,331 195,614 8,781 24,487 .06 .06 .128 .125
Russia 40,767 53,290 99,552 113,353 13,445 14,638 .33 .27 .135 .129
China NA 593,569 159,246 289,670 23,781 122,225 NA .2 .15 .42
Germany 246,751 301,633 100,790 120,784 51,140 70,901 .21 .23 .51 .59
Japan 368,525 375,160 227,882 188,324 57,282 62,264 .15 .16 .25 .33
Source.—Compiled from UNESCO (2013); Thomson Reuters, “Web of Science: Core Collection,” accessed via http://apps.webofknowledge.com.
Note.—NA p data not available.
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TABLE 4
2000–2010 International Coauthorship of SCI-SSCI Papers between BRICS and G7
World Brazil Russia India China
South
Africa Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
World S10,178,561
1,152,124
768,170
Brazil S213,340 S1,951 S1,363 S1,509 S516 S4,098 S7,870 S6,630 S4,093 S2,062 S7,385 S22,938
31,591 255 255 99 105 593 1,107 934 606 260 1,004 3,067
10,773 166 54 71 14 216 501 408 228 110 474 1,429
Russia S280,403 S1,806 S3,650 S434 S4,339 S13,438 S25,966 S8,476 S7,622 S10,449 S24,501
26,538 306 528 82 415 1,368 2,284 818 619 1,048 2,186
26,857 80 179 31 316 1,098 2,138 674 639 884 2,062
India S295,831 S2,940 S682 S3,067 S4,673 S8,212 S2,686 S5,707 S6,628 S19,702
41,305 489 150 532 756 1,156 497 698 1,005 2,844
16,780 118 28 154 225 437 138 296 369 1,126
China S831,517 S758 S14,187 S9,439 S15,982 S4,104 S25,728 S18,760 S75,959
137,329 167 2,541 1,692 2,546 741 3,504 3,213 14,685
29,905 29 451 332 713 227 1,142 745 2,561
South Africa S54,523 S1,603 S2,145 S3,064 S993 S763 S5,895 S8,055
7,430 271 373 449 202 142 919 1,233
3,498 88 99 167 44 41 327 435
Canada S452,082 S18,187 S17,607 S9,077 S9,735 S25,406 S98,776
52,431 2,524 2,537 1,417 1,075 3,464 12,121
32,572 1,089 952 472 743 1,460 6,397
France S576,446 S42,700 S31,419 S12,277 S41,361 S67,220
60,742 5,523 4,163 1,552 5,479 8,311
47,393 2,811 1,934 846 2,679 4,822
Germany S797,490 S30,852 S18,066 S53,594 S105,322
84,654 4,215 2,078 7,321 12,655
65,216 1,908 1,360 3,240 7,334
Italy S433,168 S7,215 S32,166 S55,002
48,314 930 4,403 6,958
31,011 479 2,002 3,524
Japan S815,511 S16,734 S70,606
72,694 1,953 6,884
72,503 1,227 5,680
UK S824,179 S118,154
87,302 14,362
69,526 8,142
US S3,050,652
319,926
247,667
Source.—Compiled from Thomson Reuters, “Web of Science: Core Collection,” accessed via http://apps.webofknowledge.com.
Notes.—Numbers at the bottom refer to output in 2000; center p 2010; top p total, 2000–2010.
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TABLE 5
SCIMago Ranking of Research Institutions by SCOPUS, 2006–10
WR RR CR Organization Sector Country Region O %IC NI %Q1 Spec. %Exc %Lead %EwL
1 r 1 r 1 r
Centre National de Ia Recherche
Scientifique GO FRA WE 204,784 F 50.55 F 1.32 F 58.37 f .54 r 15.81 f 59.52 f 8.41 f
2 r 1 r 1 r Chinese Academy of Sciences GO CHN AS 146,249 F 22.15 F .98 F 40.54 F .64 f 11.69 F 67.2 f 7.51 F
3 r 1 r 1 r Russian Academy of Sciences GO RUS EE 92,894 F 33.81 f .53 r 23.35 f .73 r 4.42 f 70.78 F 1.37 f
4 r 1 r 1 r Harvard Univ. HE USA NA 75,146 F 35.92 F 2.39 F 78.31 F .54 F 29.2 f 45.22 F 12.04 F
5 r 2 r 1 r Helmholtz Gemeinschaft GO DEU WE 56,128 F 55.11 F 1.54 F 59.49 F .64 r 18.68 F 50.26 f 7.92 f
6 r 3 r 2 r Max Plarick Gesellschaft GO DEU WE 51,893 F 65.3 F 1.83 F 72.31 F .67 r 24.29 F 47.89 f 11.44 f
7 r 2 r 1 r Univ. of Tokyo HE JPN AS 50,742 F 26.96 F 1.25 F 54.54 f .51 r 14.02 f 55.68 f 6.71 f
8 r 2 r 2 r
National Institutes of Health
United States HE USA NA 47,691 F 36.05 F 2.26 F 81.86 f .73 F 27.91 F 52.06 f 13.59 f
9 r 3 r 1 r Univ. of Tokyo HE CAN NA 46,756 F 41.9 F 1.79 F 66.54 f .4 r 20.82 f 51.39 F 9.05 f
10 F 4 r 1 r
Con sejo Superior de Investiga-
ciones Cientificas GO ESP WE 46,177 F 50.56 F 1.44 F 69.96 f .61 f 17.31 F 55.05 f 8.9 f
11 f 3 r 2 r Tsinghua Univ. HE CHN AS 45,312 F 18.24 F .91 F 29.4 F .67 f 11.06 F 75.31 f 7.66 F
12 F 1 r 1 r Universidadede Saa Paula HE BRA LA 44,945 F 24.81 F .83 f 38.26 f .51 r 7.93 f 61.71 f 3.84 f
13 f 4 r 3 r Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor HE USA NA 44,442 F 26.11 F 1.99 f 70.76 f .38 F 24.03 f 59.8 f 12.64 f
14 F 4 F 3 F
Ministry of Education of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China GO CHN AS 44,199 F 12.94 F .86 r 34.88 f .65 f 10.07 f 69.31 f 6.78 f
15 f 5 r 4 r Johns Hopkins Univ. HE USA NA 43,289 F 30.93 F 2.1 F 73.79 f .57 r 24.2 f 56.03 f 11.65 f
16 f 6 r 5 r Univ. of California, Los AngeIes HE USA NA 42,932 F 29.97 F 2.09 r 71.88 f .44 r 24.78 f 55.96 f 12.08 f
17 r 7 r 6 r Veterans Affairs Medical Centers HE USA NA 41,538 F 16.94 F 1.94 F 76.14 f .73 r 22.99 f 41.93 f 7.74 f
18 f 5 f 4 f Zriejian Univ. HE CHN AS 41,359 F 16.99 F .8 F 30.69 F .6 f 9.1 F 78.14 f 6.44 F
19 F 5 F 2 r
Intitut National de la Sante et de la
Recherche Medicale HE FRA WE 40,866 F 41.58 F 1.71 F 69.75 F .7 r 20.94 F 47.01 f 8.94 F
20 f 8 r 7 r Univ. of Washington HE USA NA 40,693 F 27.25 F 2.09 F 72.49 F .45 F 24.82 f 54.33 f 11.38 f
Source.—SCIMago 2013 (http://www.scimagoir.com/pdf/SIR%202012.pdf).
Note.—SCIMago brings together SCOPUS Indexed paper results from universities and research institutes (e.g., Academy of Sciences). WRp world ranking; RRp regional ranking;
CR p country ranking; GO p government; HE p higher education; HL p health; O p output; IC p international collaboration; NI p normalized impact; Q1 p high-quality
publications; Spec. p specialization index; Exc p excellence rate; Lead p scientific leadership; EwL p excellence with leadership. See explanations about methodology at http://
www.scimagoir.com/pdf/SCImago%20Institutions%20Rankings%20IBER%20en.pdf.
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RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES IN CHINA AND RUSSIA
the pressure on their FTE positions to increase performance in order to
maintain their jobs.
The ratios of university-produced SCI/SSCI papers per HC and FTE sug-
gest that Russia was losing its productivity per HC in 2010 (down to 0.27
from 0.33 in 2000). However, Russian scientists were still more productive in
comparison with scientists in Brazil, China, Germany, and Japan (table 4).
Chinese scientists initially lagged behind Japanese FTE scholars (0.15 papers
per Chinese scholar vs. 0.25 per Japanese scholar in 2000) but moved rapidly
up in FTE productivity in 2010 (0.42 compared with 0.33).
Part of the increasing productivity in China can be explained by better
global connectivity. Research on Chinese university personnel and knowledge
diasporas suggests that the linkages of Chinese researchers working, studying,
or traveling abroad have created an influential network in support of the
Chinese positions in global knowledge production.4 Chinese scientists have
been increasingly benefiting from international coauthorship. Table 4 shows
that the coauthorship of Chinese scholars with US scholars grew from 2,561
papers in 2000 to 14,685 in 2010 (almost sixfold), and the proportion of
Chinese-American coauthored papers in the total Chinese SCI/SSCI pro-
duction increased from 8.6 to 10.7 percent, and 9.6 percent in the cumulative
volume). We note too that Chinese scholars collaborated more with G7mem-
bers than with BRICS.While the same pattern is observed among other BRICS
members (i.e., stronger linkages to G7 R&D producers), the BRICS scholars
increasingly collaborated among themselves too.
While Russian scientists slowed down coauthorship in SCI/SSCI journals
in 2010, their collaborative engagements have been increasing. Chinese-Rus-
sian coauthored SCI/SSCI papers grew from 179 in 2000 to 528 in 2010,
with a cumulative volume reaching 3,650 over that decade. However, if we
keep in mind different personnel numbers, the 11-times larger university
R&D personnel in China undoubtedly contributes to the impression that
China’s rate of collaborations has been increasing faster than Russia’s (four-
fold vs. twofold on average, respectively). In comparison with China’s more
dynamic linkages with Western countries, the pace of Russian coauthorship
with Germany and the United States looks sluggish over the last decade.
To achieve the Kremlin’s aspiration to move at least five national research
universities into the world top 100 by 2020, Russian scientists would certainly
have to change their strategy from “catching-up” to “accelerative develop-
ment.” Russian universities procrastinated on critical reforms and overlooked
(or looked with fear at) the introduction of global selectivity and productivity
schemes in the early 2000s. In fact, most of the Russian publications remained
with the Russian Academy of Sciences, which held third place globally for
SCOPUS-indexed papers in the SCIMago Lab’s ranking of research institu-
4 Welch and Zhen (2008); Yang (2009); Cai (2011); Yang and Welch (2012).
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tions as of 2012 (table 5; see also table 1 for Russian universities’ proportion
of 50–55 percent of the total production of SCI/SSCI papers, in comparison
with Chinese universities: 79.5–89 percent between 2000 and 2010). SCI-
Mago’s data are also telling: while Russia had only 33 institutions mentioned
among the world’s 2,392 SCOPUS-indexed performers, China had 360 such
institutions. The Chinese Academy of Sciences held second place and was
also followed in the top 20 by the 985 Project universities, including Tsinghua
(eleventh) and Zhejiang (eighteenth), as well as the Ministry of Education
(fourteenth). Meanwhile, the closest Russian contenders, Moscow State Uni-
versity and St. Petersburg University, lagged behind in 106th place and 600th
place, respectively.
Recent discussions within the Russian government about the number of
the global pyramid-climbing universities and the rate of their publications
(e.g., 3,000 SCI papers per university; Karpova 2013) reveal that the norms
and performance targets have been largely politicized and still require a lot
of fine-tuning tomeasure up to other contenders in the global race, including
their R&D personnel capacities, remuneration schemes, and productivity
norms. Table 6 shows that national top performers in both BRICS and G7
members have significantly accelerated their rate of production over the last
decade. Moreover, universities in Brazil and China have been targeting SCI/
SSCI production levels higher than 5,000 papers per year to catch up with
producers in Canada and the USA. SCI/SSCI papers are not the only indi-
cator to gain prominence in the rankings, but they may be viewed by many
universities as a more attainable target than Nobel Prizes and Field medals.
However, the latter (as well as the “high citation” indicators) have become
increasingly important as universities move up the ladder and approach the
pinnacle of the global pyramid. For example, compare the differences in
correlations between the rise in the number of papers and university positions
below 100, and the increasing difficulty in approaching the summit among
the top 100s, despite a growth in publications.
As the national and institutional positions in world university rankings
depend on the quantity and quality of peer-reviewed publications in inter-
nationally recognized journals, the production environments require more
attention. In terms of catch-up strategies, the emerging national movers and
shakers in Russia placed a lot of hope in the new generation of scientists,
educated after the USSR’s collapse, who speak English and are eager to be
part of the global community. Meanwhile, a growing number of their coun-
terparts in China, most holding Western degrees, have been moving their
institutions to the next level: that is, coaching their peers back at home in
English proficiency and Western publication standards, sorting university and
journal brands, promoting Chinese postdocs to faculty positions in world-
class universities, launching SCI English-language journals at home and in-
creasing Chinese representation on the editorial boards of the globally rep-
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TABLE 6
National Top Producers in the ARWU Rankings and Their SCI/SSCI Production (2000–2010)
ARWU Ranking Total No. of Articles
National Total
(NT)
% of
the NT
Total No. of Articles
(SSc) NT
% of
NT,
SSc
% of SSc Articles
in Total
No. of Articles
03 10 00 10 00–10 00–10 00–10 00 10 00–10 00–10 00–10 00 10 00–10
Brazil:
Univ. of Sao Paulo 152–200 101–50 2,221 6,513 45,904 213,340 21.52 126 670 3,197 13,461 23.75 5.67 10.29 6.96
State Univ. of Campinas 351–400 201–300 427 731 4,912 213,340 2.30 16 48 183 13,461 1.36 3.75 6.57 3.73
Federal Univ. of Minas Gerais NA 301–400 114 77 1,205 213,340 .56 2 10 42 13,461 .31 1.75 12.99 3.49
Russia:
Moscow State Univ. 102–51 74 2,212 2,959 30,912 280,403 11.02 30 45 396 5,405 7.33 1.36 1.52 1.28
St. Petersburg State Univ. 401–50 301–400 857 970 10,302 280,403 3.67 10 14 180 5,405 3.33 1.17 1.44 1.75
China:
Peking Univ. 251–300 151–200 1,192 4,327 28,795 831,517 3.46 16 294 1,241 22,900 5.42 1.34 6.79 4.31
Tsinghua Univ. 201–50 151–200 44 4,197 13,243 831,517 1.59 0 189 463 22,900 2.02 .00 4.50 3.50
Fudan Univ. 301–50 201–300 716 3,191 19,900 831,517 2.39 7 134 436 22,900 1.90 .98 4.20 2.19
South Africa:
Univ. of Cape Town 251–300 201–300 601 1,359 9,770 54,523 17.92 74 330 1,734 8,904 19.47 12.31 24.28 17.75
Univ. of the Witwatersrand 451–500 301–400 553 1,004 7,564 54,523 13.87 75 270 1,478 8,904 16.60 13.56 26.89 19.54
Univ. of KwaZulu-Natal 451–500 401–500 18 834 4,299 54,523 7.88 0 172 708 8,904 7.95 .00 20.62 16.47
Canada:
Univ. of Toronto 23 27 4,229 7,445 61,062 452,082 13.51 722 1,664 11,264 68,268 16.50 17.07 22.35 18.45
Univ. of British Columbia 35 36 2,457 5,012 39,122 452,082 8.65 335 1,069 6,912 68,268 10.12 13.63 21.33 17.67
McGill Univ. 79 61 2,605 4,052 35,296 452,082 7.81 320 792 5,086 68,268 7.45 12.28 19.55 14.41
Germany:
Univ. of Munich 48 52 4,061 6,110 52,798 797,490 6.62 198 498 3,262 53,791 6.06 4.88 8.15 6.18
Technical Univ. Munich 60 56 1,685 2,973 23,581 797,490 2.96 29 144 682 53,791 1.27 1.72 4.84 2.89
Univ. of Heidelberg 58 63 1,887 3,101 25,774 797,490 3.23 90 281 1,670 53,791 3.10 4.77 9.06 6.48
US:
Harvard Univ. 1 1 7,413 11,653 100,069 3,050,652 3.28 1,370 2,451 18,451 501,539 3.68 18.48 21.03 18.44
Univ. of California, Berkeley 4 2 4,026 5,800 51,305 3,050,652 1.68 540 949 7,196 501,539 1.43 13.41 16.36 14.03
Stanford Univ. 2 3 3,980 5,833 51,179 3,050,652 1.68 664 1,028 7,997 501,539 1.59 16.68 17.62 15.63
Source.—ARWU 2013; Thomson Reuters, “Web of Science: Core Collection,” accessed via http://apps.webofknowledge.com.
Note.—In the “ARWU Ranking” column, the higher the ranking, the lower the number, and vice versa. SScp social sciences.
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utable journals abroad, and building diaspora knowledge networks. To
nurture a more “competitive attitude,” some of the new-generation scholars
began to defy the custom of guanxi (i.e., wining and dining to please im-
portant decisionmakers and influential networkers), choosing to devote their
time and full focus to research and publications. Enhancing research integrity
(e.g., eradicating plagiarism, promoting fair recognition in coauthorship)
emerged as a key goal. Empowered by the growth of R&D expenditures per
individual researcher (table A3), Chinese academics began to work toward
improving their positions at the summit of the global pyramid, such as by
reducing the gap among the “highly cited” institutions (see table A7 for two
leading universities).
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Competitive positioning is increasingly becoming an inseparable part of
national and institutional strategies for scientific alliances, networks, and col-
laborative projects in the new economies. Given the intricate layouts of re-
source distribution locally and globally, scientists in these economies may be
in either powerful or vulnerable positions tomake choices and attain benefits.
Power and vulnerability are both shaped by interdependencies between hi-
erarchies (vertical escalation) and networks (lateral expansion) that evolve
through national policies, institutional strategies, and individual behaviors.
Governments create selective funding programs and encourage collabora-
tions with competitive national “Ivy Leagues” elsewhere, while benchmarking
local scientific performance through global metrics. The positional goods
seem to be serving the purposes of governmental nationalism, postcolonial
resistance, and global science in equal measure (Marginson et al. 2010; King
2011). While aiming to level inequalities, the application of global metrics
appears to reinstate universal scientific standards and encourage improved
local accountability. The positioning appeals to reformers in the global South,
as well as in the global North: for the former, it allows for the repudiation
of a dwarfing legacy by reversing brain drain and/or recruiting new talent;
for the latter, it legitimizes their global hegemony and encourages priority
funding and political support for national heavyweights. As status anxiety
grows among universities in the South and the North, governments make
efforts to further enhance the advantages of those who emerged as “the first
movers” and hence escalate resource asymmetries locally and globally (Mer-
ton 1988; Altbach and Balan 2007; Marginson et al. 2010).
Befitting its open-door policy, the Chinese government confronted the
low standing of its national universities and took radical steps to elevate its
global position through selective funding. Chinese universities responded
with smart strategies to incentivize global networking and SCI publications.
Somewhat halfheartedly, their Russian counterparts began to reshape their
patriotic stand in order to catch up with the global standards. The younger
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generations’ perceptions of the post-Soviet reality are being restructured, as
China demonstrates how weighing national growth on global scales can re-
calibrate the national spirit and boost capacity for competitive success. Brand-
ing strategies help generate an image that is attractive to resource providers,
and “cumulative advantage” is seen as securing exponential benefits at in-
dividual, institutional, and national levels, at least for the major players in
higher education. In particular, “high producers” are often empowered to
demand higher quality academic environments, including improved access
to global networks, freedom of expression, and enhanced autonomy (Yang
and Welch 2012). In the long run, new generations of academic scientists
are most likely to benefit from their institutions’ efforts to legitimize perfor-
mance frameworks favoring scientific merit.
Within the global geometry of ubiquitous rankings, competitiveness in-
dicators, and sensationalist media, national and institutional R&D perfor-
mance gains broader appeal when it is attuned to internationally verifiable
measures that allow local politicians to claim progress and leadership, in
order to strengthen their influence locally and expand it nationally or glob-
ally. The global engagement of China and Russia, and especially the quest
to gain entry and favorable position in elite global clubs, certainly offers
opportunities for local economies to attract foreign direct investments, im-
prove trade balances, retain talent, and improve the sense of national self-
worth.
At the same time, concerns about global hierarchies are growing among
scholars and policy makers who are witnessing closed and stifling environ-
ments and are immersed in quarrels about the ranks, impact factors, and
career benefits associated with selective publication maneuvers. The pursuit
of competitive advantage for the sake of pride (either national, institutional,
or individual) sets in motion a self-destructive pathway. The foundation of
pride has proven to be historically fleeting and deceptive for both Russia and
China. For example, driven by the Cold War and competition for military
prowess, Soviet science contributed to building a colossus on feet of clay while
channeling public expenditures to the development of lethal weapons rather
than to improvements in the quality of life. The pride of the Soviet people
turned out to be misguided, and Russia became a dwarf in global science
after the Soviet Union’s collapse. These days, Russia appears to be leaning
on the shoulders of the Chinese giant currently dominating the world econ-
omy, in the same way that China leaned on the Soviet Union 60 years ago.
The reciprocal learning and borrowing of modernization policies may make
sense.
However, the two countries’ enduring predilection for science with mil-
itary-industrial or ideological purposes contributes to their continued failure
to take note of the major lesson from the Soviet period: that is, that over-
inflated national pride in technology and science and their prioritization
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.5 on Mon, 23 Feb 2015 23:17:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
504 August 2014
OLEKSIYENKO
over social sciences and humanities can have negative consequences for so-
cietal development, particularly when notions of human dignity, critical think-
ing, and diversity of cultures, languages, or beliefs are ignored or contorted.
Social sciences and humanities could have played a crucial role in preventing
the repressive practices and legacy of the Soviet Union. Given their ideological
constraints, however, Soviet governments and universities muffled academic
dissenters, bred double-speak and self-censorship, and paralyzed critical anal-
ysis and empowerment of new generations that could have worked to establish
good governance and constructive international relations. While Chinese
universities have been working diligently to distance themselves as much as
possible from the Soviet traditions, the Russian higher education system is
increasingly pushed by retrograde forces to reembrace the authoritarian leg-
acy. The current dwarfing of Russian social sciences and humanities in the
global leagues (as signified by data in tables 1 and 6) is expressed in ways
that range from increased governmental control over R&D expenditures to
enhanced governmental oversight of the international ties established at local
universities.
According to some Chinese scientists who contributed to this study, find-
ing stability “on the shoulders of giants” increasingly requires communica-
tions and creative talent that facilitates mutual exchange and understanding
across cultures. However, many of the collaborators in the “new open door
environment” also recognize that working together in social sciences and
humanities can be significantly more difficult than in the science and tech-
nology fields: the former are predisposed to divides—if not clashes—in values,
as well as to cultural and political perspectives that often impede collabo-
rations. Ensuring that local social science and humanities translate globally,
and vice versa, depends on a number of sociocultural and political precon-
ditions, including a mutual understanding of languages, histories, cultures,
conceptual perspectives, growth aspirations, and so on. National and insti-
tutional engagement in discourses about global social science and humanities
depends heavily on the capacity of individual scientists to handle cross-cul-
tural, bilingual, or multilingual communication and learning. Individual ca-
pacities may not emerge or grow in the absence of institutional and national
incentives for contributions to the global commons. The social responsibilities
agenda in these commons can easily remain on the periphery of scholarly
planning when national and institutional policies reward reputable citation
indexes, but offer insignificant recognition of academic contributions to re-
ducing inequalities, improving livelihoods and environments, as well as in-
stituting better governance and fairer legal frameworks.
Socially relevant research questions about what is measured in global
science should not be excluded from ranking systems and global performance
indicators. Indeed, the greater societal goals can be shaped through con-
structivist learning that reflects on what is reputable and what needs to be
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rewarded more in academic science. For example, would differentiated score
attributions for globally recognized and credible humanitarian awards at-
tained by faculty and alumni (e.g., Nobel Peace Prize and others) urge uni-
versities and scholars to give higher priority to social agendas and collabo-
rations? What types of criteria refinement in prestigious global tables can
reduce mindless number games and enhance discussions about linkages be-
tween global science and local development? What types of criteria could
prevent closures in times of global openings, especially when privileges de-
rived through globalism (e.g., increased productivity and influence in global
networks, growing prestige, and funding) push disadvantaged scholars (e.g.,
those lacking foreign-language skills or competitive funding) to protect their
entrenched positions in the face of change? What can create an inclusive
and mutually empowering collaborative space in global science? These ques-
tions gain importance, as asymmetries and disadvantages at the local level
threaten to distort healthy networking, collaboration, and upkeep at the
international level.
In closing, Merton’s “giant-dwarf” aphorism encourages a rethinking of
individual roles and responsibilities in advancing institutional and national
positions in global science, and vice versa. Positional goods do increasingly
matter, and a multistakeholder redistribution of resources may be required
to reduce center-periphery tensions. Which countries and which university
units have the capacity to claim positional goods that will help them evolve
into giants, rather than dwarfs, is a matter of political deliberations, economic
opportunities, and individual aspirations. More often than not, global players
confront “the self-fulfilling prophecy that inequalities will emerge sooner or
later.” Whereas some benefit more and others succeed less, the ultimate
concern should be about the extent and value of scientific contribution to
the global public good, rather than about metrics alone. In Merton’s words,
the collaborative ideal should transcend asymmetries and assume the search
for mutual advantage: “the double-edged character of the giant-and-dwarf
figure . . . can be used just as effectively to extol the dwarfs who are raised
high on the giants’ shoulders as to extol the giants without whom there would
be no eminence from which the little men could see far and wide” (1965,
43).
References
Altbach, P. 2013. The International Imperative in Higher Education. Rotterdam: Sense.
Altbach, P., and J. Balan. 2007. World Class Worldwide. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
Altbach, P., and J. Salmi. 2011. The Road to Academic Excellence: The Making of World
Class Research Universities. Washington, DC: World Bank.
ARWU. 2013. “Academic Ranking of World Universities.” Accessed July 5. http://
www.arwu.org.
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.5 on Mon, 23 Feb 2015 23:17:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
506 August 2014
OLEKSIYENKO
Burke, J. C., ed. 2006. Fixing the Fragmented University: Decentralization with Direction.
Bolton, MA: Anker.
Cai, Y. 2010. “Global Isomorphism and Governance Reform in Chinese Higher
Education.” Tertiary Education and Management 16 (3): 229–41.
Cai, H. 2011. “Deploying the Chinese Knowledge Diaspora: A Case Study of the
111 Project at Peking University.” In Competition and Cooperation among Universities
in the Age of Internationalization, ed. K. Yu and A. Stith. Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao
Tong University Press.
Clark, B. 1998. Creating Entrepreneurial Universities: Organizational Pathways of Trans-
formations. Bingley: Emerald Group.
Cowen, R. 1996. “Performativity, Post-modernity and the University.” Comparative
Education 32 (2): 245–58.
Crane, D. 1972. Invisible Colleges: Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific Communities.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dill, D., and F. Van Vught, eds. 2010. National Innovation and the Academic Research
Enterprise: Public Policy in Global Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Economist. 2013. “Returning Students: Plight of the Sea Turtles.” Economist, July 6.
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21580470-students-coming-back-
home-helped-build-modern-china-so-why-are-they-now-faring-so-poorly#sthash
.hCJeExqV.dpbs.
Froumin, I., and J. Salmi. 2007. “Rosiskie vuzy v konkurencii universitetov mirovogo
klassa” [Russian higher education institutions in global university competition].
Voprosy Obrazovaniya [Russian educational studies journal] 3:5–45.
Geiger, R. 2004. Knowledge and Money: Research Universities and the Paradox of the
Marketplace. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Gokhberg, L., and T. Kuznetsova. 2010. “Russian Federation.” In UNESCO Science
Report 2010: The Current Status of Science Around the World, ed. S. Schneegans. Paris:
UNESCO.
Guriev, S. 2009. “Research Universities in Modern Russia.” Social Research: An In-
ternational Quarterly 76 (2): 711–28.
Hayhoe, R. 1989. China’s Universities and the Open Door. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp.
Hayhoe, R., J. Li, J. Lin, and Q. Zha. 2010. Portraits of 21st Century Chinese Universities:
In the Move to Mass Higher Education. Hong Kong: CERC/Springer.
Horta, H. 2010. “The Role of the State in the Internationalization of Universities
in the Catching-Up Countries: An Analysis of the Portuguese Higher Education
System.” Higher Education Policy 23:63–81.
Jones, G. A., and A. Oleksiyenko. 2011. “The Internationalization of Canadian
University Research: A Global Higher Education Matrix Analysis of Multi-level
Governance.” Higher Education 61 (1): 41–57.
Jongbloed, B., J. Enders, and C. Salerno. 2008. “Higher Education and Its Com-
munities: Interconnections, Interdependencies, and a Research Agenda.” Higher
Education 55 (3): 303–24.
Karpova, Y. 2013. “Kto Bolshe? Medvedev: 5 Vuzov Budut v Mirovoj Sotnie! Livanov:
15!” [Who gives more? Medvedev: 5 universities will be in the world top 100!
Livanov: 15!]. Slon (blog), July 5. http://slon.ru/fast/russia/kto-bolshe-med-
vedev-5-vuzov-budut-v-mirovoy-sotne-livanov-15-962833.xhtml.
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.5 on Mon, 23 Feb 2015 23:17:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Comparative Education Review 507
RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES IN CHINA AND RUSSIA
King, R. 2011. “Governing Knowledge Globally: Science, Structuration, and the
Open Society.” In Handbook on Globalization and Higher Education, ed. R. King, S.
Marginson, and R. Naidoo. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Kortunov, A. 2009. “Russian Higher Education.” Social Research: An International
Quarterly 76 (1): 203–24.
Li, M., and Q. Chen. 2011. “Globalization, Internationalization and the World-Class
University Movement: The China Experience.” In Handbook on Globalization and
Higher Education, ed. R. King, S. Marginson, and R. Naidoo. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar.
Locke, W. 2011. “The Institutionalization of Rankings: Managing Status Anxiety in
an Increasingly Marketized Environment.” In University Rankings, ed. J. C. Shin,
R. Toutkoushian, and U. Teichler. Dordrecht: Springer.
Marginson, S. 2004. “Competition and Markets in Higher Education: A ‘Glonacal’
Analysis.” Policy Futures in Education 2 (2): 175–244.
Marginson, S., P. Murphy, and M. Peters. 2010. Global Creation: Space, Mobility and
Synchrony in the Age of the Knowledge Economy. New York: Peter Lang.
Marginson, S., and G. Rhoades. 2002. “Beyond Nation States, Markets and Systems
of Higher Education: A Glonacal Agency Heuristic.” Higher Education 43 (3):
281–309.
Markusova, V., V. Minin, A. Libkind, C. Jansz, M. Zitt, and E. Bassecoulard-Zitt.
2004. “Research in Non-metropolitan Universities as a New Stage of Science
Development in Russia.” Scientometrics 60 (3): 365–83.
Merton, R. 1965. On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript (The Post-Italianate
Edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Merton, R. 1988. “The Matthew Effect in Science II: Cumulative Advantage and
the Symbolism of Intellectual Property.” Isis 79:606–23.
Mok, Ka-Ho. 2005. “Globalization and Educational Restructuring: University Merg-
ing and Changing Governance in China.” Higher Education 50:57–88.
Mok, Ka-Ho. 2008. “Transforming Higher Education in Whose Image? Exploring
the Concept of the World Class University in Europe and Asia.” Higher Education
Policy 21:83–97.
Mu, R. 2010. “China.” In UNESCO Science Report 2010: The Current Status of Science
Around the World, ed. S. Schneegans. Paris: UNESCO.
National Research Council. 2008. International Collaborations in Behavioural and Social
Sciences: Report of a Workshop. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Obamba, M., and J. Mwema. 2009. “Symmetry and Asymmetry: New Contours,
Paradigms and Politics in African Academic Partnerships.” Higher Education Policy
22 (3): 349–71.
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). 2008. “OECD
Review of Innovation Policy: China.” OECD, Paris.
Oleksiyenko, A., and C. Sa´. 2010. “Resource Asymmetries and Cumulative Advan-
tages: Canadian and US Research Universities and the Field of Global Health.”
Higher Education 59 (3): 367–85.
Reich, M. 2002. Public-Private Partnerships for Public Health. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Center for Population and Development Studies.
Royal Society. 2011. Knowledge, Networks, and Nations: Global Scientific Collaboration
in the 21st Century. London: Royal Society.
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.5 on Mon, 23 Feb 2015 23:17:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
508 August 2014
OLEKSIYENKO
Siegel, D. 2010. Organizing for Social Partnership: Higher Education in Cross-Sector Col-
laboration. London: Routledge.
Slaughter, S. and L. Leslie. 1997. Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the En-
trepreneurial University. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Slaughter, S., and G. Rhoades. 2004. Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: Mar-
kets, State and Higher Education. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Tierney, W. G. 2001. “The Autonomy of Knowledge and the Decline of the Subject:
Postmodernism and the Reformulation of the University.” Higher Education 41
(4): 353–72.
UNESCO. 2013. “UNESCO Institute for Statistics: Customize Your Data Tables.”
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Pages/default.aspx.
Universitas 21. 2012. U21 Ranking of National Higher Education Systems 2012. Mel-
bourne: Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, and
Universitas 21.
Wagner, C., and H. Leydesdorff. 2005. “Network Structure, Self-Organization and
the Growth of International Collaboration in Science.” Research Policy 34 (10):
1608–18.
Weifang, M. 2012. “Internationalization of Chinese Higher Education.” Presenta-
tion at the University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR.
Welch, A., and Z. Zhen. 2008. “Higher Education and Global Talent Flows: Brain
Drain, Overseas Chinese Intellectuals, and Diasporic Knowledge Networks.”
Higher Education Policy 21:519–37.
Whitley, R. 2008. “Universities as Strategic Actors: Limitations and Variations.” In
The University in the Market, ed. Lars Engwall and D. Weaire. Wenner-Gren In-
ternational Series, vol. 84. London: Portland Press Limited.
Yang, R. 2009. “Enter the Dragon? China’s Higher Education Returns to the World
Community: The Case of the Peking University Personnel Reforms.” In Higher
Education: Handbook of Theory and Practice, ed. J. Smart and W. Tierney. Dordrecht:
Springer.
Yang, R., and A. Welch. 2012. “A World-Class University in China? The Case of
Tsinghua.” Higher Education 63 (5): 645–66.
Zuckerman, H. 1967. “Nobel Laureates in Science: Patterns of Productivity, Col-
laboration, and Authorship.” American Sociological Review 32 (3): 391–403.
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.5 on Mon, 23 Feb 2015 23:17:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
